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Prosocial behaviors are susceptible to individuals’ preferences regarding payoffs and
social context. In the present study, we combined individual differences with social
influence and attempted to discover the effect of social value orientation (SVO) and social
influence on prosocial behavior in a trust game and a dictator game. Prosocial behavior
in the trust game could be motivated by strategic considerations whereas individuals’
decisions in the dictator game could be associated with their social preference. In the
trust game, prosocials were less likely than proselfs to conform to the behavior of
other group members when the majority of group members distrusted the trustee. In
the dictator game, the results of the three-way ANOVA indicated that, irrespective of
the type of offer, in contrast to proselfs, prosocials were influenced more by others’
generous choices than their selfish choices, even if the selfish choices were beneficial to
themselves. The overall results demonstrated that the effect of social influence appears
to depend on individuals’ SVO: that is, prosocials tend to conform to prosocial rather
than proself behaviors.
Keywords: social value orientation, social influence, prosocial decision, trust, generosity
INTRODUCTION
People often face mixed-motive social dilemmas in which their self-interest is at variance with
what is best for their community (Balliet et al., 2009). Previous studies have shown that people
differ in fundamental ways in how they approach and interact in social dilemmas (Van Lange
et al., 2013a,b). Social value orientation (SVO) has been defined as a personal trait that reflects
how people resolve social dilemmas (Messick and McClintock, 1968; Kelley and Stahelski, 1970;
Kuhlman and Marshello, 1975; Liebrand, 1984; McClintock and Liebrand, 1988; Van Lange,
1999). The implications of individual differences in SVO refer to people’s self-regarding versus
other-regarding preferences (Van Lange, 2000). The most common manner of assessing SVO is
by means of decomposed games (Liebrand, 1984; McClintock and Liebrand, 1988). Researchers
have noted that three SVOs are common (Messick and McClintock, 1968): individuals can be
classified as prosocials, individualists, and competitors. Prosocials are defined as individuals who
attempt either to maximize the welfare of others or to choose joint gain. Individualists prefer to
maximize their own welfare, showing little concern with others’ outcomes. Finally, competitors
attempt to maximize the difference between their own welfare and others’ outcomes (Messick and
McClintock, 1968; Kuhlman and Marshello, 1975; Van Lange, 1999). Because competitors show
non-cooperative behavior similar to individualists’ and the proportion of competitors is quite small,
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previous studies have combined individualists and competitors
into a category called “proselfs” (Van Lange and Liebrand, 1991;
Van Lange et al., 1998; Bogaert et al., 2008).
Previous studies have attempted to link SVO with individuals’
behavior in prosocial decisions (McClintock and Allison, 1989;
Van Lange et al., 1998, 2007; Kanagaretnam et al., 2009). Behavior
is considered to be prosocial when it benefits others (Batson
and Powell, 2003; Twenge et al., 2007; Piff et al., 2010; Zaki
and Mitchell, 2011). Most cultures encourage or even require
prosocial behavior because it is vital to the social system. People
often perform prosocial behaviors because doing so enables them
to belong to their community or society and to enjoy the social
reward (i.e., a good reputation). Prior studies have demonstrated
that prosocials are more generous in their helping responses than
proselfs and more engaged in donating money to organizations
aimed at helping the poor and the ill (McClintock and Allison,
1989; Van Lange et al., 2007). Prosocials also exhibit greater trust
than individualists in the trust game (Kanagaretnam et al., 2009).
During the past decade, researchers have been interested
in understanding how SVO interacts with features of a social
situation to predict behavior (Balliet et al., 2009). Social
influence plays an important role in our daily lives. We
live in a highly complex social environment where social
information continuously affects our perception and decision-
making. Previous studies have shown that individuals tend to
change their opinions and behaviors in order to align with group
norms (Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004). This phenomenon, known
as “social conformity”, refers to the action of changing one’s initial
choices or opinions to match those of the group majority (Turner,
1991). Following the work of Asch (1951), psychologists have
extensively examined the causes and underlying mechanisms
of social conformity. Three motivations relate to conforming
behavior: a desire to be correct, a desire to obtain social approval
from others, and a desire to maintain a positive self-concept
(Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004). Previous studies have shown that
social influence can motivate people to behave prosocially (Shang
and Croson, 2009; Nook et al., in press). However, they leave
important questions unanswered because they say little about
the individual differences in prosocial conformity. Some studies
have demonstrated that conformity behavior could be modulated
by personality traits (Steiner and Vannoy, 1966; DeYoung et al.,
2002). From this perspective, SVO, which has been defined
as a personal trait that reflects individuals’ social preferences,
could affect individuals’ willingness to follow the majority in
prosocial behavior. To address this question, we designed two
tasks to investigate how SVO influences individuals’ conformity
behaviors in trusting behavior and generous behavior.
In Study 1, we investigated the interaction between SVO
and social influence in trusting behavior using the trust game.
There are two players in the original trust game: an investor
and a trustee (Berg et al., 1995). Both players are endowed with
$10. First, the investor decides whether to give the endowment
to the trustee. Then, the amount given is multiplied by the
experimenter. Finally, the trustee chooses whether to keep the
amount he/she received or pass any portion of the money
back to the investor. The amount passed by the investor is
used to capture trust. Trust refers to a willingness to bet
that the other will reciprocate a risky move even at a cost
to themselves (Camerer, 2003). Prosocial behavior in the trust
game could emanate from strategic considerations (Espín et al.,
2016). In the present study, we developed a variant of the
trust game in which participants, who were able to see other
group members’ choices before making a decision, were asked
to decide whether to send the endowment to a stranger or to
keep the endowment. We predicted that participants’ rate of trust
in the trust game is dependent on their SVO. Compared with
proselfs, prosocials should be more trusting in the trust game
(Kanagaretnam et al., 2009). In addition, we hypothesized that
the choices of the majority would affect participants’ trusting
behavior: that is, subjects would trust the trustee when they
see that the majority of the group does so. Further, previous
studies have shown that conformity behavior could be affected
by personality traits (Steiner and Vannoy, 1966; DeYoung et al.,
2002). With the assumption that SVO, which has been defined
as a fundamental personal trait that reflects how people resolve
social dilemmas, could influence individuals’ decisions in the
trust game (Kanagaretnam et al., 2009), we expected that the
effect of social influence in the trust game would be modulated
by SVO.
In Study 2, we were interested in the interaction between
SVO and social influence in the dictator game. We used a
modified dictator game, which was designed by Zaki and Mitchell
(2011), to investigate the effect of social influence on generous
behavior, free of strategic considerations. Participants made
iterated choices about whether to allocate varying amounts of
money to themselves or to another person (see Experimental
design and procedure in Study 2 for details). This task yields a
behavioral measure of generosity (giving to the receiver at a cost
to one’s self) (Zaki and Mitchell, 2011). Participants’ decision
in this task could be motivated by their social preference rather
than strategic considerations because the second player is passive.
We assumed that participants’ choices would be dependent on
their SVO: that is, compared with proselfs, prosocials would
tend to make more generous choices in the dictator game. We
also hypothesized that the choices of the majority would affect
subjects’ choices: that is, subjects would make more generous
choices when they saw that the majority of the group allocated
money to the receiver. In the end, as prosocials show a natural
willingness to help others and they are more generous than
proselfs (McClintock and Allison, 1989; Van Lange et al., 2007),
we predicted that the effect of social influence in the dictator game
would be modulated by SVO and that prosocials might be less
likely to be influenced by the selfish choices of group members.
STUDY 1
Materials and Methods
Participants
One hundred thirty-six healthy right-handed participants
completed study 1. All were native Mandarin speakers, with no
neurological or psychological disorders, and with normal color
vision. Written informed consent was obtained after detailed
explanation of the experiment. This study was conducted in
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accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki and approved by the
Ethics Committee of Southwest University.
Measurement of Social Value Orientation
We used a questionnaire including a series of nine decomposed
games to assess a participant’s SVO (Van Lange and Kuhlman,
1994; Van Lange et al., 1997). This questionnaire is an
efficient and easy-to-administer instrument (Van Lange et al.,
1997). Subjects were classified as prosocial, individualistic, or
competitive if at least six of nine decisions were consistent with
a particular value orientation (Van Lange and Kuhlman, 1994;
Van Lange et al., 1997). One hundred sixteen participants fell
into one of three SVO. We identified 52 prosocials (35 females),
56 individualists (23 females) and 8 competitors (1 females).
Following prior research on SVO, we combined the individualists
and competitors to form a group of proselfs (Van Lange and
Liebrand, 1991; Van Lange et al., 1998).
Experimental Design and Procedure
After arrived at the laboratory, participants were told that they
would perform the experiment with four other participants,
who were in separate rooms, but that they would see the
choices of the other group members on the computer screen
during the experiment. In the experiment, participants would
play an on-line monetary game as an investor independently
with 70 different strangers (trustees). The strangers were
randomly selected from the university and played the game with
participants through a local network. Other group members also
did not know anything about trustees.
In each trial, both players were endowed withU2. The investor
was restricted to the options of keeping the endowment or
sending all U2. If the investor decided to send U2 to the trustee,
this money would be tripled. Then the trustee was restricted
to either send nothing back or send half of the tripled amount
back (U3). However, the investor would not know the outcome
(i.e., trustee’s choice) during the task. Subjects were told that
they will receive U10 for participating in the experiment plus the
additional money earned from ten of their decisions, chosen at
random, during the trust game. Actually, subjects earned a show-
up fee (U15) and a bonus (U4). We asked participants whether
s/he believed the existence of trustees and group members after
they finished the task. Six participants reported that they did
not believed the existence of trustees. Therefore, their data were
excluded in the analysis.
The hypotheses of this study were tested in a 2 × 3 (SVO:
Prosocial Orientation vs. Proself Orientation × Social Influence:
No influence vs. Trust influence vs. Distrust influence) factorial
design. The experiment contained one block (70 trials). The
duration of a trial is approximately 11 s. In 10 of the trials,
two peers decided to send the endowments to the trustee while
the other two peers decided to keep the endowments. These
trials were not included in the final analysis because they were
used solely to maintain believability of the interaction between
participant and the four peers. In one-third of the remaining trials
(20 trials), the group’s choices were hidden from the subject (the
no information, or baseline condition; we told participants that
they would not see their peers’ choices in these trials because
the decisions in these trials were not made by all of the four
other members). In this situation, they would see four “ × ”
symbols. For the 20 trials of the trust influence condition, three
or four group members decided to send the endowments to
the trustee. For the 20 trials of the distrust influence condition,
one or none of the group members decided to send the
endowments to the trustee. These trials were presented in a
random order.
Participants then received details about the procedure of the
experiment. At the beginning of each trial, the participants were
presented with a fixation point for a 1s duration. The offer would
be shown on the screen for 1 s, followed by a fixation point for
duration of 1 s. They could see the number of the trustee in
the top of the offer screen. Then the choices of group members
would be presented for 2 s under the offer, followed by a fixation
point for duration of 1–2 s. Subsequently, the decision phase
was shown on the screen for 3 s. Participant used the index and
middle fingers of their right hand to respond to the offer by
pressing keyboard (“1” to invest and “2” to keep the endowment).
In the end, the word “next” displayed for 1s, which indicated
that the next trial was about to begin. The sequence of events
in a trial is illustrated in Figure 1. Before performing the task,
participants completed a training session. We told participants
that the computer used to conduct the pre-experiment training
was not connected to the local network, therefore the choices of
the other group members would remain hidden. A PC running
E-Prime 2.0 was used to display the stimuli and acquire the
responses of the participants.
Results
Trials in which the subjects did not respond in the decision
stage were excluded from further data analyses. 5.3% of
total trials were rejected to enter the following data analyses.
Social influence effect was measured by the rate of trust
of participants. A 2 (SVO: proselfs, prosocials) × 3 (social
influence: trust, distrust, baseline) repeated measure ANOVA
revealed a significant main effect of the factor social influence,
F(2,113) = 14.31, p < 0.001. Participants trusted the trustee
at a significantly higher rate in the trust condition (M = 0.69,
SD = 0.3) than in the distrust condition (M = 0.43, SD = 0.32)
and baseline (M = 0.56, SD = 0.26). The main effect of
SVO was significant, F(1,114) = 10.74, p < 0.001. Prosocial
individuals (M = 0.62, SD = 0.31) trusted the trustee at a
significantly higher rate than proself individuals (M = 0.51,
SD= 0.31).
The interaction between SVO and social influence was
significant, F(2,113) = 4.23, p < 0.05 (Figure 2). The results
indicated that prosocial individuals (M = 0.65, SD = 0.24)
trusted the trustee at a significant higher rate than proself
individuals (M = 0.48, SD = 0.25) in the baseline condition,
F(1,114) = 13.91, p < 0.001. In addition, prosocial individuals
also (M = 0.5, SD = 0.33) trusted the trustee at a significant
higher rate than proself individuals (M = 0.37, SD = 0.3)
in the distrust condition, F(1,114) = 4.49, p < 0.05. The
difference between prosocials (M = 0.7, SD = 0.31) and proselfs
(M = 0.68, SD = 0.29) in the trust condition was not significant,
F(1,114)= 0.1, p= 0.75.
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FIGURE 1 | Demonstration of sequence of events in a trial (take trust influence as an illustration).
FIGURE 2 | The rate of trust (Error bars represent standard errors of the mean).
Discussion
A prior study found that genetics explain about 20% of the
cross-sectional variation in trust game behavior (Cesarini et al.,
2008), thus suggesting stable individual differences in trust.
Our results, like those of Kanagaretnam et al. (2009), suggest
that SVO may partially underlie such individual differences.
However, the findings of Cesarini et al. (2008) also indicate
that about 80% of variation must be explained by unknown
environmental factors (Ahern et al., 2014). According to the
present findings, social conformity might be one such factor
since individuals’ behavior in the trust game could indeed be
influenced by the opinions of peers (as in other environments;
see Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004). The present study showed
that prosocials were less likely than proselfs to conform to group
members when the majority of group members did not trust the
trustee.
Prosocials tend to consider the impact of their behavior on
others and strive to maximize joint outcomes (De Cremer and
Van Lange, 2001). They prefer to seek win-win situations in a
disagreement (Van Lange et al., 1997). In contrast to prosocials,
proselfs strive to maximize their own outcomes. Therefore,
prosocials show a higher level of prosocial behavior than proselfs
in the trust game (Kanagaretnam et al., 2009). In the present
study, prosocials showed a lower level of conformity behavior
than proselfs when group members distrusted the trustee. We
infer that prosocials are less influenced by group members’
distrust behavior because they are naturally prosocial and trusting
individuals. In this vein, it might be argued that peers’ choices in
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the trust game serve as a cue of expected trustworthiness, which
could affect individuals’ emotional systems in decision making.
Because participants were asked to make decisions under time
pressure, the emotional reactions could guide their decisions.
As a previous study showed, some people trust the trustee due
to strategic self-interest whereas other people trust the trustee
because of social efficiency reasons (Espín et al., 2016). Prosocials
care more about the social efficiency whereas proselfs tend to be
self-interested. Therefore, prosocials still trust the trustee when
they perceive that the trustee will not reciprocate (i.e., the distrust
condition).
STUDY 2
Materials and Methods
Participants
One hundred three healthy right-handed participants completed
study 2. All were native Mandarin speakers, with no neurological
or psychological disorders, and with normal color vision. Written
informed consent was obtained after detailed explanation of the
experiment. This study was conducted in accordance with the
Declaration of Helsinki and approved by the Ethics Committee
of Southwest University.
Measurement of Social Value Orientation
We used a questionnaire including a series of nine decomposed
games to assess a participant’s SVO (Van Lange and Kuhlman,
1994; Van Lange et al., 1997). Subjects were classified as prosocial,
individualistic, or competitive if at least six of nine decisions were
consistent with a particular value orientation (Van Lange and
Kuhlman, 1994; Van Lange et al., 1997). Ninety-five participants
fell into one of three SVO. We identified 47 prosocials (29
females), 42 individualists (23 females), and 6 competitors.
Following prior research on SVO, we combined the individualists
and competitors to form a group of proself individuals (Van
Lange and Liebrand, 1991; Van Lange et al., 1998).
Experimental Design and Procedure
The hypotheses of this study were tested in a 2 × 2 × 3
(SVO: Prosocial Orientation vs. Proself Orientation × Offer
Type: Selfish vs. Generous × Social Influence: No influence vs.
Selfish influence vs. Generous influence) factorial design. Each
trial began with two monetary offers, one associated with the
participant and the other with the receiver. Participants made
iterated choices about whether to allocate varying amounts of
money to themselves or to the receiver. For example, if the offer
assigned U1.00 to the participant and U3.00 to the receiver,
participants should choose between U1.00 for themselves and
U3.00 for the receiver. The amounts that each person stood to
gain varied across trials but always adhered to one of a set of
six ratios specifying the relationship between the self vs. other
monetary amounts: 3:1, 2:1, 3:2, 4:3, 5:4, and 1:1. Each ratio
could produce two relationships between the amounts that the
participant and the receiver stood to gain. Thus there were eleven
ratios in present experiment (3:1, 2:1, 3:2, 4:3, 5:4, 1:1, 4:5, 3:4,
2:3, 1:2, and 1:3). For each trial, a random value between U0.00
and U3.00 was chosen, and a second value was determined by
transforming the first value according to the ratio that applied
during that trial. For example, if the amount ofU1.00 was selected
and the ratio was 2:1, the other one was U0.5. The maximum
amount that either the participant or receiver stood to gain in
one trial was U9.00.
The experiment contained 120 trials. On average, a trial lasted
13 s. There were five types of offers in the present study. If the
ratio were larger than 1:1 (e.g., 2:1), the offer was a selfish offer. If
the ratio were smaller than 1:1 (e.g., 1:2), the offer was a generous
offer. If the ratio was 1:1, the offer was an equal offer. Besides, we
also added “pure-self ” and “pure-other” offers in the experiment.
During pure-self trials the participant was presented with offers
of a non-zero amount of money (e.g., U1.00) for herself/himself
andU0.00 for the receiver, while in the pure-other condition, the
participant was presented with offers of U0.00 for herself/himself
and a non-zero amount of money for the receiver. Finally, we
also added non-reward trials in which participants chose between
U0.00 for herself/himself and U0.00 for the receiver. Overall,
there were fifty selfish offers, fifty generous offers, ten equal offers,
ten pure-self offers, ten pure-other offers and ten non-reward
offers. The selfish offer condition and generous offer condition
each comprised 15 selfish influence trials, 15 generous influence
trials, 15 baseline trials and 5 mediate influence trials (these
trials were not included in the final analysis because they were
used solely to maintain believability of the interaction between
participant and the four peers). We only included trials in which
the participant and receiver stood to gain unequal, non-zero
amounts of money.
When participants arrived at the laboratory, they were told
individually that they would participate in the experiment with
another four subjects, who were in separate rooms. In the
experiment, they would independently play a monetary game
with a human receiver, who would be in the other room.
Group members and participants knew nothing about each other
and they were told that they would also not meet each other
after the experiment. Participants were told that they would be
making repeated decisions about whether to allocate money to
themselves, or to the receiver. Five of their decisions, chosen
at random by the system, would be enacted and added to the
final payment. To minimize the influence of reputation motives
on the participant’s choices, participants were told that the
receiver would not know that the participant had completed the
distribution game, and that the additional compensation would
simply be included in the receiver’s payment after the experiment.
The participant could observe the choices of the other four
group members through a local network on the computer
during the experiment, but group members would not know
the participant’s choices. In addition, because participants used
different computers, and because the order of offer presentation
is random, they would sometimes not see the choices of group
members if a group member had not responded to the offer.
In this situation, they would see four “ × ” symbols. These
trials were classified as the baseline condition. These instructions
allowed participants to believe in the existence of the other
group members. We asked participants whether s/he believed the
existence of group members and the receiver after they finished
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the task. One participant reported that he did not believed the
existence of group members and the receiver. Therefore, his data
were excluded in the analysis.
Participants then received instructions about how the
experiment would proceed. At the beginning of each trial, the
participants were presented with a fixation point for 1 s. The
offer would be shown on the screen for 2 s, followed by a fixation
point for duration of 1–2 s. Then, the choices of group members
would be presented for 2 s underneath the offer, followed by a
fixation point that would last for duration of 1–2 s. In the end, the
decision phase was shown on the screen for 3 s. Participants used
the index and middle fingers of their right hand to respond to the
offer by pressing one of the two buttons on the keyboard (“1” to
allocate to self and “2” to allocate to the receiver). The decision
phase was followed by the word “Next”, which was displayed
for 1 s and indicated that the next trial was about to begin. The
sequence of events in a trial is illustrated in Figure 3. Before
performing the task, participants completed a training session.
We told participants that the computer used to conduct the pre-
experiment training was not connected to the local network,
therefore the choices of the other group members would remain
hidden. A PC running E-Prime 2.0 was used to display the stimuli
and acquire the responses of the participants.
Results
Trials in which the subjects did not respond in the decision stage
were excluded from further data analyses. 4.6% of total trials were
rejected to enter the following data analyses.
Social influence effect was measured by the rate of allocate
money to the receiver. A 2 (SVO: proselfs, prosocials) × 2
(offer: selfish, generous) × 3 (social influence: selfish, generous,
baseline) repeated measure ANOVA revealed a significant main
effect of the factor social influence, F(2,92) = 21.27, p < 0.001.
Participants allocated money to receiver at a significantly higher
rate in the generous influence condition (M = 0.5, SD = 0.35)
than in the selfish influence condition (M= 0.39, SD= 0.34). The
main effect of offer was significant, F(1,93) = 93.87, p < 0.001.
Participants allocated money to the receiver at a significantly
higher rate in generous offer condition (M = 0.61, SD = 0.31)
than in selfish offer condition (M = 0.24, SD = 0.26). This result
is consistent with a previous study (Zaki and Mitchell, 2011). The
main effect of SVO was close to significance (Mproselfs = 0.39,
SDproselfs = 0.22; Mprosocials = 0.45, SDprosocials = 0.23),
F(1,93)= 3.47, p= 0.067.
The interaction between offer and social influence was
significant, F(2,92) = 8.49, p < 0.001. The result indicated that
participants allocated money to the receiver at a significantly
higher rate (M = 0.7, SD = 0.3) in generous offer-generous
influence condition than in generous offer-selfish influence
condition (M = 0.59, SD = 0.3), p < 0.001, and in generous
offer-baseline condition (M = 0.54, SD = 0.3), p < 0.01. In
the selfish offer condition, participants allocated money to the
receiver at a significantly higher rate in the generous influence
condition (M = 0.3, SD = 0.25) than in the selfish influence
condition (M = 0.19, SD = 0.25), p < 0.001, and in baseline
(M = 0.22, SD = 0.25), p < 0.001. The difference between selfish
influence condition and baseline condition was not significant,
p= 0.081. The interaction between SVO and social influence was
not significant, F(2,92)= 3.47, p= 0.478.
The interaction between SVO, offer type and social
influence was significant, F(2,92) = 4.97, p < 0.01 (Figure 4).
Regardless of the type of offer, proselfs allocated money to
the receiver at a significantly higher rate in the generous
influence condition (Mselfish offer = 0.27, SDselfish offer = 0.19;
FIGURE 3 | Demonstration of sequence of events in a trial (take generous offer and selfish influence as an illustration).
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FIGURE 4 | The rate of generous decisions (SG: selfish influence-generous offer; SS: selfish influence-selfish offer; GG: generous influence-generous
offer; GS: generous influence-selfish offer; BG: baseline-generous offer; BS: baseline-selfish offer. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean).
Mgenerous offer = 0.71, SDgenerous offer = 0.26) than in selfish
influence condition (Mselfish offer = 0.15, SDselfish offer = 0.16,
p< 0.001; Mgenerous offer= 0.55, SDgenerous offer= 0.25, p< 0.001),
and in baseline condition (Mselfish offer = 0.21, SDselfish offer = 0.2,
p< 0.05; Mgenerous offer = 0.48, SDgenerous offer = 0.26, p< 0.001).
For prosocials, they allocated money to the receiver at a
significantly higher rate in generous influence condition
(M = 0.7, SD = 0.35) than in the baseline (M = 0.6, SD = 0.33)
when the offer is generous offer, p< 0.05. However, the difference
between selfish influence condition (M = 0.63, SD = 0.34) and
baseline was not significant, p= 0.268. In addition, the difference
between selfish influence condition and generous influence
condition was also not significant, p = 0.126. In the selfish
offer condition, prosocials allocated money to the receiver at
a significantly higher rate in the generous influence condition
(M = 0.33, SD = 0.31) than in selfish influence condition
(M = 0.24, SD = 0.32, p < 0.01) and in baseline condition
(M = 0.23, SD = 0.3, p < 0.001). The difference between
selfish influence condition and baseline was not significant,
p= 0.926.
Discussion
Study 2 set out to investigate the effects of SVO and social
influence in generous decisions. People often change their
decisions and judgments to conform to normative group
behavior (Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004; Klucharev et al.,
2009; Wei et al., 2013). The present study showed that
individuals’ generous decisions can be influenced by the group
members’ choices; however, this effect can be modulated by
individuals’ SVO. Results of the three-way ANOVA showed
that no matter the offers were selfish or generous, proselfs
were influenced by others’ selfish choices and generous
choices. However, when it comes to prosocials, they were
influenced by others’ generous choices rather than their selfish
choices.
Generosity is defined as helping another at a cost to oneself;
therefore, generosity is a kind of prosocial behavior (Zak
et al., 2007). Prosocials have a stable preference for maximizing
joint outcomes, but proselfs prefer to maximize their own
benefits (Van Lange, 2000). Additionally, prior studies have
demonstrated that prosocials are more generous in their helping
responses than proselfs and more engaged in donating money to
organizations aimed at helping the poor and the ill (McClintock
and Allison, 1989; Van Lange et al., 2007). We infer that
selfish choices are conflict with prosocials’ social preference
and prosocials know that selfish behavior is not encouraged
by social norms. Therefore, in both offer conditions, prosocials
were influenced by others’ generous choices rather than their
selfish choices, even if the selfish choices were beneficial to
themselves.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Social value orientation is regarded as a stable personality
trait that reflects how people evaluate outcomes for self and
others (Messick and McClintock, 1968). Individual SVO can
determine and predict individuals’ choice behavior in a wide
variety of decisions (Messick and McClintock, 1968; Kuhlman
and Marshello, 1975; Van Lange, 1999), including prosocial
decisions (McClintock and Allison, 1989; Van Lange et al., 1998,
2007; Kanagaretnam et al., 2009). According to previous studies,
prosocials tend to trust others, and they are more generous than
proselfs (McClintock and Allison, 1989; Van Lange et al., 2007;
Kanagaretnam et al., 2009). In the present study, in agreement
with previous ones, we found that people tend to conform to
the choices of group members in prosocial decisions. However,
our study also found that individuals’ SVO could modulate
the effect of social influence in prosocial decisions. Relative
to proselfs, prosocials were less likely to conform to proself
behaviors. We infer that prosocials know that proself behavior
is not accepted by general social norms and they can resist
the proself choices of other group members. Proselfs, as well,
know that prosocial behavior is encouraged by social norms.
Therefore, they would experience group pressure when they
realized that the majority was choosing the prosocial option
(Asch, 1951; Strickland and Crowne, 1962; Becker et al., 1964)
and would then be more likely to conform to the choices of
group members, even when these choices conflicted with their
own preferences.
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CONCLUSION
Prior experimental studies have provided evidence that prosocial
behaviors are susceptible to individuals’ preferences for payoffs
and social context (McCabe et al., 2003; Boone et al., 2008;
Declerck et al., 2010). In the present studies, we combined
individual differences with social influence in an attempt to
discover the effect of SVO and social influence on prosocial
behavior in the trust game and the dictator game. Our results
extend our current understanding of prosocial conformity by
showing that the effect of social influence on prosocial behavior
depends on a person’s SVO. Prosocials tend to follow prosocial
choices rather than proself behaviors. Prosocials have a natural
willingness to behave prosocially and they know that prosocial
behavior is encouraged by social norms (McClintock and
Allison, 1989; Van Lange et al., 2007). Therefore, they can
resist the proself influence that conflicts with their own social
preference.
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